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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE*
Michael Edmund O'Neill**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Virginia is so named (as opposed to be-
ing denominated simply a "state") because the term "common-
wealth" is used to indicate a government in which "supreme
power is vested in the people."' That term is particularly apt, for
in what better way does a government provide for the common
weal of its people than by protecting them against crime, while at
the same time respecting their individual rights and liberties?
This is a delicate balance, one that is reflected in this survey of
the most recent developments in Virginia criminal law and proce-
dure. The legislative enactments and judicial decisions examined
here portray the careful quest to resolve the tensions inherent be-
tween respect for the individual and the need for efficient law en-
forcement.
General legal surveys of this kind are always difficult to con-
struct, because while they furnish useful information to the prac-
titioner, they seldom provide a framework by which to evaluate
legal trends. Nevertheless, the legal developments summarized
herein represent only incremental changes and reveal Virginia
governmental institutions' generally careful and pragmatic ap-
proach to legal innovation.
* Copyright retained by author.
** Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; Commis-
sioner for the United States Sentencing Commission; B.A., summa cum laude, 1987,
Brigham Young University; J.D., 1990, Yale Law School. The views expressed in this arti-
cle are my own, and thus cannot be attributed to the Sentencing Commission. This article
summarizes select criminal law and procedure decisions issued by the Supreme Court of
Virginia and the Court of Appeals of Virginia (sitting en banc) between July 1, 1999, and
June 30, 2000. In addition, it surveys a number of the more important criminal law en-
actments from the 2000 Session of the Virginia General Assembly. I would like to thank
Todd Heflin for his invaluable research assistance.
1. THE HORNBOOK OF VIRGINIA HISTORY 88 (Emily J. Salmon & Edward D.C. Camp-
bell, Jr., eds., 4th ed. 1994).
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II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Despite the fact that the overwhelming number of criminal
prosecutions brought in the United States occur in state, rather
than federal, courts,2 it is the United States Constitution-not
analogous state charters-that dominates criminal procedure.
Since the dawning of the Warren Court, and the dramatic expan-
sion of criminal defendants' rights under the Federal Constitu-
tion, and the concurrent application of those rights to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, it has been accepted that
the Bill of Rights establishes a basic core of procedural (and sub-
stantive) protections that states may not violate. Nevertheless,
most states, including the Commonwealth of Virginia, possess
their own constitutions that provide important protections for
criminal defendants. The Virginia Constitution, for example, con-
tains analogues to the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures,' the Fifth Amendment's pro-
tection against compelled self-incrimination,4 and the Sixth
Amendment's various procedural protections.5 With the predomi-
nance of federal constitutional law, however, and its displacement
of state law in criminal prosecutions, Virginia constitutional pro-
visions rarely receive mention in state court decisions. That is a
problem perhaps worth remedying, particularly if litigants seek
to encourage more broadly based protections than those afforded
under the Federal Constitution. Perhaps, as the United States
Supreme Court becomes increasingly hesitant to expand the Bill
of Rights' protections beyond those expressly enumerated, we will
see state courts turn more frequently to their own constitutions
2. In 1996, for example, there were 997,970 felony convictions in state courts. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS-1998 431 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1998). During the same
period there were only 43,883 felony convictions in United States District Courts. Id. at
402. Thus, there were over twenty state convictions for every federal conviction obtained
during 1996, which translates into roughly only 4.2% of all criminal convictions being se-
cured at the federal level. See id. This number corresponds to recently reported figures
that there are approximately 35,000 federal prosecutions every year, making up fewer
than 5% of all prosecutions nationally. Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal
Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally
State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 921, 970 (1997).
3. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
4. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. See id.
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for guidance.6 That having been said, the following discussion will
use the federal Constitution as its organizing framework.
1. The Fourth Amendment
a. Abandoned Contraband
In Cochran v. Commonwealth,7 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reaffirmed the rule that an en banc court of appeals, when
equally divided, must affirm the trial court's judgment.' The court
further held that the defendant had abandoned his drugs, and
thus the trial court did not err in denying his suppression mo-
tion.9
In Cochran, a deputy sheriff "was dispatched to a parking lot to
meet an unknown person who had called concerning recovery of
stolen property." ° When the deputy arrived at the parking lot, he
noticed three men in a car parked near a public telephone." The
deputy asked the driver if anyone had called the police. 2 Before
he received a response, Cochran started to get out of the car. 3
The deputy, however, asked him to remain seated while he
"talked to the driver."'4 As the deputy spoke with the driver,
Cochran again opened the car door. 5 Although the deputy in-
structed him to stay in the car, Cochran once again attempted to
exit the vehicle. 6 As he stepped from the vehicle, Cochran shoved
a bluish-colored bag under the car, which the deputy retrieved. 7
Inside, the deputy found three small plastic bags and a film can-
ister, which were subsequently determined to contain illegal
drugs.'8 The supreme court held that the defendant's efforts to
6. The classic discussion of the importance of state constitutions in the protection of
citizens' rights may be found in Justice William J. Brennan's State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
7. 258 Va. 604, 521 S.E.2d 287 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1692 (2000).
8. Id. at 606, 521 S.E.2d at 288.
9. See id. at 608, 521 S.E.2d at 289.
10. Id. at 607, 521 S.E.2d at 289.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 607-08, 521 S.E.2d at 289.
18. Id. at 608, 521 S.E.2d at 289.
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exit the car demonstrated that he was not within the officer's con-
trol, and thus pursuant to California v. Hodari D.,"9 the bag had
been abandoned.0
b. Consent to a Body-Cavity Search
In Hughes v. Commonwealth,2 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, held that the defendant, who had con-
sented to a pat-down search of his person and a "visual inspec-
tion" inside his underwear, did not by the same token consent to a
body-cavity search.22 Hughes is one of those cases that reminds
me why I attended law school as opposed to the police academy.
After receiving a tip that a "very light complected male with dark
wavy hair wearing blue jeans and a white shirt" was selling drugs
on "320 West Grace Street," police officers spied an individual
matching that description at that location.23 They approached
him and indicated that they had received a tip that he was selling
drugs.24 The officers asked if they could frisk Hughes because the
informant had told them he "was keeping the money in his left
pocket, and.., drugs.., in his underwear."25 Hughes denied the
accusation, and consented to a pat-down search of his person.26
The officers discovered a considerable amount of cash in the de-
fendant's left pocket, and asked whether they could check inside
his underwear.2 ' Hughes agreed to allow the officers to "check
further."8 After the officer found nothing "in the front of
[Hughes's] underwear," the officer noted "'it's got to be behind
you,"' and thus asked Hughes if he didn't "'mind going ahead and
bending over."'29 Although Hughes did not verbally respond, he
leaned over.3" The officer told the defendant to cough, and then
spotted a plastic bag protruding "halfway" from Hughes's anus.3'
In response to Hughes's contention that the scope of his con-
19. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
20. Cochran, 258 Va. at 608, 521 S.E.2d at 289.
21. 31 Va. App. 447, 524 S.E.2d 155 (Ct. App. 2000).
22. Id. at 457, 524 S.E.2d at 160.
23. Id. at 452-53, 524 S.E.2d at 158.
24. Id. at 453, 524 S.E.2d at 158.
25. Id. at 452-53, 524 S.E.2d at 158.
26. Id. at 453, 524 S.E.2d at 158.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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sent did not extend to the body-cavity search, the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia assumed that the initial frisk and the visual in-
spection inside his underwear were lawful intrusions into
Hughes's privacy.3 2 From there, however, things became a bit
tricky for the court. Relying principally upon Moss v. Common-
wealth,3 in which the court concluded that a defendant's consent
to a search of his person did not necessarily confer permission for
the police to conduct a strip search, 4 the court held that having
Hughes cough and the officer's subsequent removal of the plastic
bag from Hughes's anus exceeded the scope of the defendant's
consent.3 Noting that Taylor v. Commonwealth6 held that "strip
searches, which are 'peculiarly intrusive,' are constrained by due
process requirements of reasonableness and require 'special justi-
fication,'"37 the court determined that the even more intrusive
body-cavity searches require additional, explicit consent.8 The
court flatly refused to consider Hughes's bending over at the offi-
cer's request as any sort of consent to the body-cavity search be-
cause "after Hughes bent over, [the officer] no longer sought
Hughes' [sic] consent for the continued search."39 "Without a re-
quest for Hughes to consent," the court explained, "we are not
able to find that Hughes voluntarily coughed and of his own free
will was allowing [the officer] to visually inspect his anal cav-
ity."4" The court ruled that as a result of "the highly intrusive and
personal nature of body cavity searches.., consent to such a
search will not be inferred from a suspect's silence or apparent
acquiescence to an officer's progressively extending the scope of a
consensual generalized search."" This case is interesting in two
important respects. First, it reasonably extends the doctrine it
created for strip searches to the far more intrusive body-cavity
searches. Second, it places law enforcement officers on notice that
they must obtain express consent before conducting such
searches.
32. Id. at 456, 524 S.E.2d at 160.
33. 30 Va. App. 219, 516 S.E.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1999).
34. Id. at 225, 516 S.E.2d at 249.
35. Hughes, 31 Va. App. at 456, 524 S.E.2d at 160.
36. 28 Va. App. 638, 507 S.E.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1998).
37. Hughes, 31 Va. App. at 457, 524 S.E.2d at 160 (quoting Taylor, 28 Va. App. at 642,
507 S.E.2d at 663).
38. Id. at 459, 524 S.E.2d at 161.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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c. Vehicular Stop
In Reittinger v. Commonwealth,42 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia ruled that, despite the police officer's express statement
that the defendant was free to leave following a routine traffic
stop, the circumstances in that case were such that "a reasonable
person... would [not] have considered that he was free to disre-
gard the deputies and simply drive away."' Here, the defendant
was stopped because his van had only one operable headlight."
The deputy decided to forgo issuing a citation, and instead gave
Reittinger a verbal warning and then told him that he was "'free
to go."' 45 Immediately after telling Reittinger he could leave, how-
ever, the deputy asked whether he had any contraband in the ve-
hicle.46 The defendant replied in the negative, but the deputy
nevertheless asked for permission to search the van.47 The deputy
repeated his request twice more, but Reittinger, rather than ver-
bally respond, stepped from the van.' The deputy saw what he
described as a "'large bulge" in the defendant's pants pocket and
conducted a pat-down search.49 He felt something that he believed
could have been a weapon and ordered Reittinger to empty his
pockets.5" The defendant did as he was told, and removed "an ob-
ject that proved to be a smoking pipe containing marijuana resi-
due."51
Although the Rockbridge County Circuit Court determined
that the initial seizure was illegal, it concluded that the pat-down
search was necessary for the deputy's protection, and thus re-
fused to suppress the evidence.52 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
agreed. 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, held that de-
spite the fact that the deputy told Reittinger he was free to leave,
42. 260 Va. 232, 532 S.E.2d 25 (2000).
43. Id. at 237, 532 S.E.2d at 28.
44. Id. at 234, 532 S.E.2d at 26.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 236, 532 S.E.2d at 27.
53. Id. at 235, 532 S.E.2d at 26; Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 724, 514
S.E.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1999).
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the events transpiring immediately after the deputy made this
statement "would suggest to a reasonable person that just the op-
posite was the case."54 As a consequence, the court held that
"Reittinger was unlawfully seized in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights" and ordered the evidence suppressed.55
d. Traffic Checkpoints
Traffic checkpoints have become an increasingly familiar
weapon in law enforcement's efforts to control drunk driving and
to disrupt drug-trafficking. As a result, litigation over their pro-
priety has increased significantly. In Bass v. Commonwealth,56
the Supreme Court of Virginia held: (1) that a driver's alleged
evasion of a traffic checkpoint did not violate a statute making it
unlawful for a motorist to refuse to stop her vehicle when asked
to do so by police; (2) that the checkpoint itself did not fall within
the statutory definition of an "other traffic control device;" and (3)
that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity to stop the defendant.57
In Bass, police officers established a checkpoint to stop motor-
ists.5" An officer observed Bass making a series of legal maneu-
vers that the officer believed to be a concerted effort to avoid the
checkpoint.59 As a consequence, the officer decided to stop the ve-
hicle pursuant to the department's policy to pull over vehicles
being driven in a manner so as to elude a traffic checkpoint."
Other than the (subjectively) apparent attempt to avoid the
checkpoint, however, the defendant did nothing illegal.6 As a
consequence, the supreme court determined that insufficient
grounds existed upon which to stop Bass and that her otherwise
legal avoidance of the checkpoint did not violate Virginia Code
section 46.2-833.1, which makes it unlawful to "'evade any stop
sign... or other traffic control device."'62 The court declined to
54. Reittinger, 260 Va. at 237, 532 S.E.2d at 28.
55. Id.
56. 259 Va. 470, 525 S.E.2d 921 (2000).
57. Id. at 476-78, 525 S.E.2d at 924-25.
58. Id. at 473, 525 S.E.2d at 922.
59. Id. at 473, 525 S.E.2d at 923.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 476-78, 525 S.E.2d at 924-25 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-833.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1998)).
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construe the checkpoint as being equivalent to a "traffic control
device," and thus held that Bass was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment."
2. The Fifth Amendment-Right to Counsel
In McDaniel v. Commonwealth,' the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, held that the defendant unambiguously in-
voked his right to counsel after being advised under the
Miranda65 warnings.66 Here, the police arrested McDaniel for
burglary and larceny, read him the relevant warnings, but de-
ferred questioning him until later.67 After searching McDaniel's
apartment, the police questioned the defendant, who stated, "'I
think I would rather have an attorney here to speak for me.' 68
The interviewing detective testified that he interpreted McDan-
iel's statement to be a question, not a request for counsel. 9 The
detective informed McDaniel that two witnesses saw him commit
the offenses and that McDaniel's accomplice had not only con-
fessed to the crimes, but had also implicated McDaniel in the
crime.7" McDaniel, acknowledging that the police already seemed
to "know everything," confessed to committing the crimes.7
The trial court found McDaniel's statement sufficiently am-
biguous to deny his suppression motion. 2 A panel of the Court of
Appeals of Virginia reversed,73 and upon en banc review, over-
turned the convictions and remanded for a new trial.4 Relying
principally upon Miranda and Davis v. United States,75 the court
engaged in a "plain meaning" analysis of the defendant's state-
ment and had little difficulty determining that the statement was
not a question, but, rather, was sufficiently clear that the detec-
63. Id. at 477-79, 525 S.E.2d at 925.
64. 30 Va. App. 602, 518 S.E.2d 851 (Ct. App. 2000).
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. McDaniel, 30 Va. App. at 607, 518 S.E.2d at 854.
67. Id. at 603-04, 518 S.E.2d at 852.
68. Id. at 604, 518 S.E.2d at 852.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 605-06, 518 S.E.2d at 852.
73. McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 432, 506 S.E.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1998).
74. McDaniel, 30 Va. App. at 603, 518 S.E.2d at 852.
75. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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tive should have terminated his interrogation.76
3. The Sixth Amendment
a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Although traditionally fact-bound and of little continuing im-
portance, the following ineffective assistance cases are interesting
in that they demonstrate the difficulty of establishing a success-
ful claim, even in the face of a potential conflict. In Moore v. Hin-
kle,77 the defendant was convicted of abduction with the intent to
defile and subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition alleging
that his counsel was ineffective.78 Here, counsel was largely un-
available for consultation between the defendant's first trial
(which resulted in a mistrial) and subsequent trial in which he
was convicted.79 At the commencement of the second trial, the de-
fendant's attorney informed the trial court that he was not ready
to proceed and wished to be removed from the case. ° After sev-
eral unfortunate incidents between the court and defense counsel,
including a contempt citation for Moore's attorney, the trial pro-
ceeded.8 The defendant's attorney cross-examined each of the
Commonwealth's witnesses and gave a closing argument, but
chose (as he did in the first trial) not to put on any evidence in
Moore's defense.82
Contrary to the defendant's claims, the court held that none of
the other activities of the defendant's attorney were in actual con-
flict with his representation of the defendant.83 The activities, in-
stead, simply competed with his time to devote to the defendant's
case.8 The court noted that just because a lawyer fails to manage
his time properly, resulting in the interests of some clients being
addressed to the detriment of others, an actual conflict of interest
85does not arise.
76. McDaniel, 30 Va. App. at 606-07, 518 S.E.2d at 853.
77. 259 Va. 479,527 S.E.2d 419 (2000).
78. Id. at 486, 527 S.E.2d at 423.
79. Id. at 483, 527 S.E.2d at 420-2L
80. Id. at 483, 527 S.E.2d at 421.
8L Id. at 484-85, 527 S.E.2d at 421-22.
82. Id. at 482, 485, 527 S.E.2d at 420, 422.
83. Id. at 489-90, 527 S.E.2d at 424-25.
84. Id. at 489, 527 S.E.2d at 425.
85. Id. at 489-90, 527 S.E.2d at 425.
2000]
758 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:749
After dismissing the conflict of interest argument, the court
found that the defendant could not show that "but for" the actions
of his attorney, the outcome of the trial would have been differ-
ent. 6 The court held that the Commonwealth's evidence at trial
fully supported the jury's verdict and the defendant did not show
that the deficient representation prejudiced his case, and thus af-
firmed the dismissal of the petition.87
Similarly, in Turner v. Commonwealth,"8 the Supreme Court of
Virginia dismissed the defendant's ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim. 9 That claim was based on the fact that during his trial,
Turner's defense counsel was attempting to secure employment
with the Commonwealth Attorney's Office. ° The court held that
the mere filing of the employment application was not enough to
create a conflict of interest for the defendant's attorney without a
showing that he had done more to create the conflict.9' The court
noted that both the defendant's attorney and the Commonwealth
had filed affidavits stating, in effect, that they had never dis-
cussed Turner's case.92 The court found that without some show-
ing that the defendant's attorney's performance was deficient, the
allegations of a conflict of interest were baseless.93
b. Waiver of the Right to Counsel Pursuant to a Plea Agreement
In an important case bearing upon the waiver of constitutional
rights pursuant to a plea agreement, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, held that, upon the defendant's uncondi-
tional guilty plea, he impliedly waived objection to any non-
jurisdictional defects occurring before his plea was accepted.94 In
Terry v. Commonwealth, the defendant pleaded guilty to one
count of felony carnal knowledge of a child.95 The trial judge im-
86. Id. at 490-92, 527 S.E.2d at 425-26.
87. Id. at 492, 527 S.E.2d at 426.
88. 259 Va. 816, 528 S.E.2d 112 (2000).
89. Id. at 821, 528 S.E.2d at 115.
90. Id. at 818, 528 S.E.2d at 113.
91. Id. at 820, 528 S.E.2d at 115.
92. Id. at 819, 528 S.E.2d at 114.
93. See id. at 820, 528 S.E.2d at 114-15.
94 See Terry v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 192, 200-01, 516 S.E.2d 233, 237 (Ct.
App. 1999).
95. Id. at 194, 516 S.E.2d at 234. Carnal knowledge of a child is a violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-63. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
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96posed a ten-year sentence, suspending all but two of those years.
Terry appealed that sentence, arguing that the admission of cer-
tain evidence at his sentencing hearing violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.97
The police arrested Terry and questioned him until he asked to
speak with an attorney.98 Because Terry's charge involved sexual
contact with a minor, a social services investigator and two police
investigators came to the jail and initiated contact with Terry,
who was being represented by a public defender.99 Terry's counsel
was neither present at the interview, nor did counsel authorize
the interrogation in his absence.'0 0 During the interview, Terry
volunteered information about his prior sexual contact with the
victim.'0 ' Terry subsequently moved to suppress the statements
he made to the social services investigator and the police detec-
tives." 2 He argued that because his counsel had not been present,
and he had not consented to the questioning, any statements he
made were in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel.0 3 Terry's suppression motion was never argued before the
trial court, however, nor did the court issue a ruling on the mo-
tion because the defendant agreed to plead to a lesser charge.0 4
At the defendant's sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth
called the social worker to testify about Terry's statements re-
garding his sexual contact with the victim.'0 5 Terry's counsel ob-
jected, however, arguing that it was irrelevant to the charge to
which Terry had pleaded and, moreover, that the statements
were obtained in violation of Terry's Sixth Amendment counsel
right.0 6 The Commonwealth responded that because the trial
court had not ruled on Terry's suppression motion, no evidence
either had been, or should have been, suppressed."' The court
overruled Terry's objection and permitted the social worker to
testify. 0
8
96. Terry, 30 Va. App. at 196, 516 S.E.2d at 235.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 194, 516 S.E.2d at 234.
99. Id.
100. Id.
10L Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 195, 516 S.E.2d at 235.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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The en banc Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, concluding
that because Terry had made a "voluntary, intelligent and uncon-
ditional guilty plea," the claim was waived. °9 The court was care-
ful to point out that because Terry was plainly aware of his po-
tential Sixth Amendment claim, that claim should have been
preserved pursuant to the plea agreement."' His failure to pre-
serve the issue for appeal resulted in a waiver."' The court went
to considerable lengths to distinguish the facts of this case from
those in which the alleged Sixth Amendment violation occurred
after the plea,"2 or as in Mitchell v. United States,113 where the
United States Supreme Court rendered a narrow holding estab-
lishing that a guilty plea could not waive a Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination at a sentencing
hearing.14
c. Confrontation Rights
Turning to basic confrontation rights, in Lilly v. Common-
wealth," '5 the Supreme Court of Virginia, on remand from the
United States Supreme Court, held that the admission of a non-
testifying accomplice's statements implicating the defendant as
the triggerman in the killing was not harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt."' Here, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to
death for a premeditated murder during a robbery." 7 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and the imposi-
tion of the death sentence on direct appeal."' Thereafter, Lilly
successfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari."' The Supreme Court reversed a portion of the
109. Id. at 200-01, 516 S.E.2d at 237.
110. Id. at 196, 516 S.E.2d at 235.
111. See id. at 200-01, 516 S.E.2d at 237.
112. See id. at 198-200, 516 S.E.2d at 236-37 (discussing Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680
(1989); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1987); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985);
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1980); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Bey v.
Morton, 124 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727 (4th Cir. 1994)).
113. 526 U.S. 314(1999).
114. See Terry, 30 Va. App. at 200, 516 S.E.2d at 237.
115. 258 Va. 548, 523 S.E.2d 208 (1999).
116. Id. at 553, 523 S.E.2d at 210.
117. Id. at 550, 523 S.E.2d at 208.
118. 255 Va. 558, 499 S.E.2d 522 (1998), rev'd sub nom. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116
(1999).
119. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123 (1999).
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Virginia court's judgment, ruling that the admission into evidence
at Lilly's trial of two confessions made by Lilly's brother, who had
refused to testify, violated Lilly's Sixth Amendment right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.120 The Supreme Court
remanded the case with directions to determine whether this er-
ror was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 2'
Applying the familiar Chapman122 standard, which requires a
determination of "whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the convic-
tion,"1" the Supreme Court of Virginia revisited the impact of the
erroneously admitted testimony on the defendant's case.'2 The
court explained that in order to impose the death penalty, "the
Commonwealth had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Lilly was the actual perpetrator... or the 'triggerman'
in the murder."125 However, the court concluded that the evidence
of Lilly's guilt as the triggerman "was not overwhelming."12 As
the court explained, only two pieces of evidence supported the
conjecture that Lilly was the triggerman: testimony from eyewit-
ness Gary Wayne Barker, who was present at the murder, and
the statements of Mark Lilly, the defendant's brother. 7
"'Barker's eyewitness testimony [, the court explained,] unques-
tionably was the centerpiece of, or... the 'key to' the Common-
wealth's case.'"'12 Barker testified that Lilly fatally shot DeFilip-
pis three times in the head. 29 Mark Lilly's statement served as
the sole corroborating evidence for Barker's testimony. 3 ° In the
absence of that statement, Barker's testimony, which might eas-
ily have been motivated by his own self-interest to avoid the
death penalty, was the only thing identifying Lilly as the trig-
german.' 3 ' In weighing the credibility of Barker's statement, the
court concluded it would have been "inconceivable that the jury
120. Id. at 139-40.
121. Id. at 140 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967)).
122. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
123. Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
124. Lilly, 258 Va. at 551-53, 523 S.E.2d at 209-10.
125. Id. at 551, 523 S.E.2d at 209.
126. Id. at 553, 523 S.E.2d at 210.
127. Id. at 552-53, 523 S.E.2d at 510.
128. Id. at 552, 523 S.E.2d at 210.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 552-53, 523 S.E.2d at 210.
131. See id.
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would not have weighed Barker's credibility in light of the con-
curring evidence of Mark's statements."32 Those statements,
"coming as they did, from Lilly's brother undoubtedly carried
weight with the jury." 133 Thus, the court ruled, "there is a reason-
able possibility that those statements contributed to Lilly's con-
viction for capital murder." 134 As a consequence, the court could
not say that the error in admitting Mark Lilly's statements was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 13
5
In a variation on this theme, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held in Dearing v. Commonwealth16 that sufficient cause existed
for a joint trial to go forward and that the erroneous admission of
a co-defendant's confession, in violation of Dearing's confrontation
rights, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 37 Here, a grand
jury indicted Dearing for robbery and the use of a firearm during
the commission of that offense. 13 The Commonwealth tried him
jointly with Leroy Vernoise Dorsey, a co-defendant who had par-
ticipated in the robbery.
39
Dearing argued that the trial court erred by granting the
Commonwealth's motion for a joint trial because the Common-
wealth had failed to establish good cause as required by Virginia
Code section 19.2-262.1.'4o He further argued that his rights were
prejudiced because he could not compel his co-defendant to testify
as a witness in a joint trial.14 ' The court, however, easily dis-
missed the defendant's claim. The court noted that it was clear
132. Id. at 553, 523 S.E.2d at 210.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Although the court reversed Lilly's capital murder conviction and related fire-
arms charge, it affirmed his conviction for the caijacking, robbery, abduction, and the four
related firearms charges. Id.
136. 259 Va. 117, 524 S.E.2d 121 (2000).
137. Id. at 123-24, 524 S.E.2d at 125.
138. Id. at 119, 524 S.E.2d at 122.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 122, 524 S.E.2d at 123-24. Section 19.2-262.1 reads:
On motion of the Commonwealth, for good cause shown, the court shall order
persons charged with participating in contemporaneous and related acts or
occurrences or in a series of acts or occurrences constituting an offense or of-
fenses, to be tried jointly unless such joint trial would constitute prejudice to
a defendant. If the court finds that a joint trial would constitute prejudice to
a defendant, the court shall order severance as to that defendant or provide
such other relief as justice requires.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
141. Dearing, 259 Va. at 122, 524 S.E.2d at 124.
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beyond peradventure that Dearing had no right to compel his co-
defendant to testify if that individual elected to assert his own
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.142
The more difficult issue for the court was whether the co-
defendant's statement was properly admitted into evidence. Re-
lying chiefly upon Lilly v. Virginia,"4 the court determined that it
could not "conclude that Dorsey's confession contained particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness or that the statement was
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception for the Confrontation
Clause as discussed by the Supreme Court in Lilly."' As a con-
sequence, the court found that the trial court erred in admitting
Dorsey's statement." Regardless, the court determined that, in
light of the overwhelming evidence supporting Dearing's convic-
tion, the trial court's erroneous admission of the confession and
resulting Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond any
reasonable doubt. 46
d. The Effect of a Nolle Prosequi on the Speedy Trial Protection
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Harris v. Common-
wealth'47 that good cause supported the Commonwealth's motion
for nolle prosequi of the original indictment, and that, as a result,
the subsequent indictment was not governed by the initial in-
dictment's speedy trial limitation." s The court further ruled that
the Commonwealth's decision to nolle prosequi the first indict-
ment was neither in bad faith nor rose to the level of prosecuto-
rial misconduct, and that the trial court's decision to grant the
Commonwealth's motion to nolle the case did not deprive the de-
fendant of procedural due process. 49
Harris was indicted for creating an insurance fraud to obtain
money by false pretenses. 5 After a trial date was set, the Com-
142. Id.
143. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
144. Dearing, 259 Va. at 123, 524 S.E.2d at 124.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 123-24,524 S.E.2d at 125.
147. 258 Va. 576, 520 S.E.2d 825 (1999).
148. See id. at 583-84, 520 S.E.2d at 829.
149. Id. at 583-85, 520 S.E.2d at 829-30.
150. Id. at 579, 520 S.E.2d at 826.
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monwealth filed a continuance motion on the grounds that it had
been unable to obtain certain documents essential to the prosecu-
tion.' 5' Harris opposed the continuance, arguing that his wit-
nesses would be inconvenienced by the delay and that the Com-
monwealth had failed to act with due diligence to obtain the
documents.'52 After the trial court denied the motion and admon-
ished the Commonwealth for not timely subpoenaing the docu-
ments, the Commonwealth moved to nolle prosequi the indict-
ment.5 ' Over Harris's objection, the trial court granted the
motion.'54 Harris was subsequently indicted again for the same
offenses, and after unsuccessfully asserting his speedy trial
rights, entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to
appeal the denial of his speedy trial claim."'
The supreme court had little trouble concluding that the trial
court properly granted the Commonwealth's motion for nolle pro-
sequi and that the decision to nolle the original indictment was
not in bad faith.'56 As a consequence, in light of Barker v.
Wingo,'57 the court could find no violation of Harris's speedy trial
rights, nor could it find that Harris was prejudiced in presenting
his defense. 5 '
e. When a Trial Commences for Purposes of the Speedy Trial Act
In Hutchins v. Commonwealth,'59 the en banc Court of Appeals
of Virginia held that for purposes of the Commonwealth's speedy
trial statute, 6 ' a "trial" commences when-in a jury trial-the
first juror "is sworn for voir dire."'6' A jury convicted Hutchins of
unlawful wounding, and he was subsequently sentenced to three
years in prison. 62 In an unpublished opinion, a divided panel of
151. Id.
152. Id. at 579, 520 S.E.2d at 827.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 580-81, 520 S.E.2d at 827-28.
156. See id. at 583-85, 520 S.E.2d at 829-30.
157. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
158. See Harris, 258 Va. at 585-87, 520 S.E.2d at 830-31.
159. 30 Va. App. 574, 518 S.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1999).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
161. Hutchins, 30 Va. App. at 575, 518 S.E.2d at 838.
162. Id.
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the court of appeals affirmed.'63 In a case of first impression, the
en banc court sought to determine when a jury trial begins for the
purpose of tolling the Virginia speedy trial statute.'" After care-
fully considering the revised statute and the General Assembly's
intent, the court adopted the federal rule and held that a jury
trial commences-and thus tolls the statutory bar-when the
first venire person is sworn. 165 Because Hutchins's trial failed to
start by the date specified by the applicable statutory provisions,
the court of appeals ruled that Hutchins was denied his statutory
speedy trial right and thus barred the prosecution. 66
f. Delay Attributable to the Defendant Cannot Be Used to
Invoke A Speedy Trial Defense
In Heath v. Commonwealth,67 the en banc Court of Appeals of
Virginia affirmed the defendant's murder conviction and ruled
that his speedy trial rights were not violated. 16 In this case, the
defendant was charged with murder and the preliminary hearing
was held in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the
City of Petersburg on March 20, 1997.169 A grand jury subse-
quently indicted Heath on September 18, 1997.' During the time
in between the preliminary hearing and the grand jury indict-
ment, the Commonwealth obtained a court order for Heath to
provide a blood sample.171 Shortly thereafter, the court granted
the defendant's motion for a psychiatric evaluation to determine
his competency." 2 The case was eventually scheduled for trial
some fifty days past the Virginia speedy trial statute's five-month
requirement.1
3
On Heath's initial appeal, his murder conviction was reversed,
and the matter was ordered discharged for failure to comply with
the five-month speedy trial limitation.74 On rehearing, however,
the court held that the prosecution had met its burden of showing
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 577-80, 518 S.E.2d at 839-40.
166. Id. at 580, 518 S.E.2d at 841.
167. 32 Va. App. 176, 526 S.E.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1999).
168. Id. at 183, 526 S.E.2d at 801.
169. Id. at 178, 526 S.E.2d at 799.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 179, 526 S.E.2d at 799.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 179, 526 S.E.2d at 799-800.
174 Id. at 178, 526 S.E.2d at 799 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 2000)).
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that the defendant's prosecution fell within the five-month time
limit."5 The Commonwealth showed that while some of the delay
was due to the wait for laboratory test results, most of the delay
was in connection with the continuance allowing completion of
the defendant's requested psychiatric examinations. 76
4. The Eighth Amendment and Related Death Penalty Cases
While the Supreme Court of Virginia has denied most Eighth
Amendment claims related to the death penalty, a new area of
capital litigation has begun to surface-namely, questions in-
volving the use of DNA evidence, both to exonerate the innocent
and to establish guilt. DNA evidence has proven to be both a
powerful weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal as well as an effec-
tive tool for defendants seeking to establish their innocence. In-
deed, highly publicized cases during this past year have demon-
strated the importance of DNA testing as a means to free the
wrongfully convicted. Undoubtedly, issues involving DNA testing
will continue to receive scrutiny by both the courts and the Gen-
eral Assembly in the coming years.
In Commonwealth v. Vinson,1'7 for example, the Supreme Court
of Virginia grappled with the question of (among other things)
whether the trial court in a capital case is required to search in-
dependently for a DNA expert for a defendant. 7 1 With the advent
of DNA testing, courts have been presented with thorny new legal
issues. In Vinson, the defendant requested appointment by the
court of an "independent" expert to conduct DNA analysis. 179 At a
pre-trial hearing on his motion for such an appointment, Vinson
acknowledged he was unable to locate anyone who suited his
needs." ° The court continued the matter until the following day
175. Id. at 183, 526 S.E.2d at 801.
176. See id. at 182-83, 526 S.E.2d at 801.
177. 258 Va. 459, 522 S.E.2d 170 (1999), cert. denied sub nom. Vinson v. Virginia, 120
S. Ct. 2226 (2000).
178. See id. at 467, 522 S.E.2d at 175-76. The court also held that the defendant's war-
rantless arrest was lawful; that a minor error in the chain of custody regarding a blood
sample did not render that evidence inadmissible; that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the defendant's convictions; that defendant's prior unadjudicated conduct was admis-
sible at the penalty phase to establish future dangerousness; and that the death penalty
was not itself disproportionate punishment. Id. at 468-72, 522 S.E.2d at 176-79.
179. Id. at 467, 522 S.E.2d at 175.
180. Id.
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to allow the defendant additional time to search for an expert, ex-
plaining that his request was "somewhat vague" as to what sort
of expert he was requesting.'' In light of Vinson's inability either
to state precisely what he sought from an expert or to find some-
one who suited his alleged needs, the trial court denied his mo-
tion. 2 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the trial
court's decision." The court explained that Vinson had been
granted ample time to locate a DNA expert, but had failed to do
so, and, in any event, was unable to demonstrate why he would
need the appointment of such an expert.'" The court dismissed
the defendant's additional contentions as meritless.8 5
In Johnson v. Commonwealth,8 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the defendant's convictions for capital murder and rape,
and refused to commute his death sentence.'87 Here, the defen-
dant stabbed a twenty-two-year-old woman to death.' 8 The court
rejected Johnson's claims that the death penalty was dispropor-
tionate to his crime'8 9 and that the trial court erred in admitting
his inculpatory statements and certain items of testimonial and
photographic evidence. 90 In an issue of first impression, the court
also dismissed the defendant's claim that the statutes establish-
ing the Commonwealth's DNA data bank 9' violate various consti-
tutional provisions.'92 The court relied upon two Fourth Circuit
cases that upheld the statutes against federal constitutional
challenge.'93 The court explained that "the minor intrusion caused
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 467, 522 S.E.2d at 175-76.
185. Id. at 467-72, 522 S.E.2d at 176-79.
186. 259 Va. 654, 529 S.E.2d 769 (2000).
187. Id. at 684, 529 S.E.2d at 786.
188. Id. at 662-63, 529 S.E.2d at 773-74.
189. Id. at 683-84, 529 S.E.2d at 786.
190. Id. at 670-71, 675-81, 529 S.E.2d at 778-79, 781-85.
191. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2 to -310.7 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
192. Johnson, 259 Va. at 671-72, 529 S.E.2d at 779-80.
193. See id. at 672, 529 S.E.2d at 779 (discussing Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1111 (1994), and Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992)). In Jones, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
procurement of a blood sample for DNA analysis from a convicted felon under Virginia
Code section 19.2-310.2 does not violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. 962 F.2d at 307. In Ewell, the Fourth Circuit held that Vir-
ginia Code section 19.2-310.2 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 11 F.3d at 484.
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by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia's inter-
est... in determining inmates' 'identification characteristics spe-
cific to the person' for improved law enforcement."194 The court
expressly held that this reasoning was "equally applicable to the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures set forth
in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia." 95
The court further rejected Johnson's claim that the Common-
wealth's recently enacted DNA statutes violated Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution of Virginia, which forbids compelled self-
incrimination. 9 ' The court declared that "[tihe taking of a blood
sample does not implicate any rights against self-incrimination,
because such an act is not testimonial or communicative in na-
ture."'97 Nor, the court declared, did the DNA statutes in any way
violate the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and un-
usual punishment, or the parallel right secured by Article 1, Sec-
tion 9 of the Constitution of Virginia, because "[t]he DNA statutes
are not penal in nature."9 ' Similarly, the court rejected Johnson's
contention either that the DNA statutes violate the federal con-
stitutional due process right or the roughly parallel provision
found in Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, or
"that the DNA statutes are arbitrary and unreliable, fail to es-
tablish meaningful restrictions on the seizure and dissemination
of DNA material, and constitute an 'improper delegation of [leg-
islative] powers."" 99
b. Lesser-Included Charges in a Capital Prosecution
In Orbe v. Commonwealth,"' the defendant was convicted of
four charges in connection with a murder during the commission
of a robbery.2"' On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial
194. Johnson, 259 Va. at 672, 529 S.E.2d at 779 (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 307) (in-
ternal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 673, 529 S.E.2d at 780 (alteration in original).
200. 258 Va. 390, 519 S.E.2d 808 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1970 (2000).
201. Id. at 393, 519 S.E.2d at 809. Those convictions were: (1) capital murder, in viola-
tion of Virginia Code section 18.2-31(4); (2) use or display of a firearm while committing
murder, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1; (3) robbery, in violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-58; and (4) use or display of a firearm while committing robbery, in vio-
lation of Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1. Id.
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court's refusal to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses, the
finding of future dangerousness based on consideration of unad-
judicated criminal acts, the admission of certain photographic
evidence, and the court's refusal to permit the defendant to mail a
questionnaire to each prospective juror. °2
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected each of the defendant's
contentions. 3 The court explained that "[i]t is well-established in
Virginia that jury instructions 'are proper only if supported by
the evidence, and that more than a scintilla of evidence is neces-
sary to support a lesser-included offense instruction requested by
the defendant."'2 4 The court could find no evidence supporting
the defendant's requested instructions.0 5 By contrast, in light of
the defendant's numerous criminal acts following the murder, the
court had little trouble determining that sufficient evidence ex-
isted to establish the defendant's potential dangerousness.2 °6 The
court also found no error in the decision to admit the photo-
graphic evidence or the trial court's refusal to permit the defen-
dant to mail a questionnaire to each prospective juror, noting that
"[t]he manner in which voir dire is conducted lies within the trial
court's discretion."0 7 Finally, the court rejected as without merit
the defendant's contention that the death sentence was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary fac-
tors, or was in any way disproportionate to the crime.2 °
c. Unadjudicated Acts to Prove Future Dangerousness
In Bailey v. Commonwealth,0 9 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the defendant's capital sentence for murdering his wife
and two-year-old son.210 The court rejected, as moot, the defen-
dant's contentions that the Commonwealth could not use unadju-
dicated criminal conduct to prove future dangerousness. 21' The
202. Id. at 393-94, 519 S.E.2d at 810.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 398, 519 S.E.2d at 813 (quoting Commonwealth v. Donkor, 256 Va. 443, 445,
507 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1998)).
205. See id. at 399, 519 S.E.2d at 813.
206. See id. at 400-01, 519 S.E.2d at 813-14.
207. Id. at 403, 519 S.E.2d at 815.
208. Id. at 403-05, 519 S.E.2d at 816-17.
209. 259 Va. 723, 529 S.E.2d 570 (2000).
210. Id. at 751, 529 S.E.2d at 586-87.
211. Id. at 736, 529 S.E.2d at 577.
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court further ruled that the trial court did not err in admitting
photographs of the deceased and the crime scene, in declining to
appoint an "expert investigator," or in refusing to suppress his in-
culpatory statements to police.212 Finally, the court held that the
death sentence was neither disproportionate to his crimes, nor
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factors. 3
B. Substantive Criminal Law
1. Legal Excuse is Personal to the Actor Invoking It
In Taylor v. Commonwealth,214 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, affirmed the defendant's conviction for be-
ing a principal in the second degree in the abduction of her boy-
friend's child.215 Taylor argued that because her boyfriend was the
child's biological father, he was legally excused from criminal i-
ability in the abduction.1 6 In effect, Taylor averred that under
the statute, a biological parent could not abduct his child.21 If he
were legally excused, she argued, it would be impossible to con-
vict her as a principal in the second degree.21
The court held that the father did not have a legal excuse to
take the child, and thus the evidence at trial was sufficient to find
Taylor guilty of being a principle in the second degree. 19 Even if
the child's father possessed a legal excuse for taking the child, the
court explained that "'.[excuses, in contrast [to justifications], are
always personal to the actor."'22 ° Based on this principle, even if
the father had a legal excuse to take the child, that defense would
not extend to protect Taylor's actions as a principal in the second
degree.22'
212. Id. at 737-39, 745-46, 529 S.E.2d at 578-79, 582-83.
213. Id. at 750-51, 529 S.E.2d at 586.
214. 31 Va. App. 54, 521 S.E.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1999).
215. Id. at 56-57, 521 S.E.2d at 294.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 59, 521 S.E.2d at 295.
219. Id. at 64-65, 521 S.E.2d at 298.
220. Id. at 63, 521 S.E.2d at 297 (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMiNAL
LAW 762 (1978) (alteration in original)).
221. Id. at 63-64, 521 S.E.2d at 297.
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2. Criminal Negligence
In Conrad v. Commonwealth,222 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en bane, held that the evidence adduced at trial
supported a finding of criminal negligence arising from the de-
fendant's falling asleep at the wheel of an automobile and strik-
ing and killing a pedestrian. 2' Here, the fact that the defendant
admitted that he had worked the day before the accident, had
been awake the entire night, and knew he was falling asleep
while driving, but continued on because he was close to home,
was sufficient to show that he was operating the motor vehicle
with a "reckless disregard for human life."2 ' The en bane court
thus held that the evidence was plainly sufficient to support the
conviction 22
5
3. Brandishing a Firearm in Defense of Property
In Commonwealth v. Alexander,226 the defendant was convicted
of brandishing a firearm when he threatened the victim with an
unloaded rifle while the victim was attempting to repossess the
defendant's vehicle.227 The trial judge refused to grant the defen-
dant's requested instruction that would have directed the jury to
acquit if it felt he had brandished the weapon because he thought
it was reasonably necessary to protect his property.2 8 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia reversed the decision of the trial court,
finding that it had erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the
law of the defense of personal property. 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed, explaining
that it is unlawful to use deadly force unless it is done to save
"life or limb, or prevent a great crime, or to accomplish a neces-
222. 31 Va. App. 113, 521 S.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1999).
223. Id. at 124, 521 S.E.2d at 327. In a related case, Hall v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.
App. 616, 529 S.E.2d 829 (Ct. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc,
affirmed the defendant's conviction for aggravated involuntary manslaughter resulting
from an automobile accident wherein the defendant was driving under the influence of al-
cohol, and found harmless any inadvertent errors committed at trial. Id. at 637, 529
S.E.2d at 839.
224 Conrad, 31 Va. App. at 124, 521 S.E.2d at 327.
225. Id.
226. 260 Va. 238, 531 S.E.2d 567 (2000).
227. Id. at 239-40, 531 S.E.2d at 567-68.
228. Id. at 240, 531 S.E.2d at 568.
229. Id. at 240-41, 531 S.E.2d at 568.
20001
772 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:749
sary public duty."23 ° The court disagreed with the defendant's
contention that this rule does not apply when there is a mere
threat to use deadly force."' Explaining that this would have the
effect of undoing the basic principle that one is not justified in
using deadly force to defend property, the supreme court ordered
the case remanded for reinstatement of the original sentencing
order.23 2
4. Assault on an Off-Duty Police Officer
In Oulds v. Commonwealth,23 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed a court of appeals decision that upheld the defendant's
conviction for assault and battery on a law enforcement officer. 4
In this case, a Lynchburg police officer was providing security for
a local mall during his off-duty hours." 5 During a routine arrest
on mall property, the defendant assaulted the officer, and was
thus subsequently charged with assault and battery on a law en-
forcement officer.236 The supreme court held that the trial court
did not err in taking judicial notice of a city ordinance authorizing
police officers to use their police powers during off-duty employ-
ment, and thus affirmed the defendant's conviction for assault
and battery on a law enforcement officer.237
5. Mental Illness and Continued Involuntary Commitment
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Mercer v. Commonwealth, 8
affirmed a trial court's determination that the defendant was not
entitled to conditional release after having been acquitted of
criminal charges by reason of insanity.239 The trial court ordered
Mercer to remain confined because she was in need of inpatient
hospitalization and was determined to present an undue risk to
public safety.24 °
230. Id. at 241, 531 S.E.2d at 568 (citing State v. Morgan, 25 N.C. 186, 193 (1842)).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 242, 531 S.E.2d at 569.
233. 260 Va. 210, 532 S.E.2d 33 (2000).
234. Id. at 211-12, 246, 532 S.E.2d at 34, 36.
235. Id. at 212, 532 S.E.2d at 34.
236. Id. at 211, 532 S.E.2d at 34. Virginia Code section 18.2-57 makes assault and bat-
tery on a law enforcement officer a crime. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Repl. Vol. 1996 &
Cum. Supp. 2000).
237. Oulds, 260 Va. at 213-14, 532 S.E.2d at 35-36.
238. 259 Va. 235, 523 S.E.2d 213 (2000).
239. Id. at 243, 523 S.E.2d at 217.
240. Id. at 239, 523 S.E.2d at 215.
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Here, the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity
on charges stemming from a caijacking.24 Shortly thereafter, the
trial court remanded Mercer to the custody of the Commissioner
of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and
Substance Abuse Services. 2 The court initially released the de-
fendant, but following a thirty-day inpatient evaluation, ordered
her recommitted.' At a subsequent hearing to determine if Mer-
cer needed inpatient hospitalization, the court heard expert tes-
timony from two witnesses who, while concluding that the defen-
dant suffered from antisocial personality disorder and poly-
substance dependence,' disagreed as to whether those condi-
tions fell within the definition of a "mental illness" as defined by
Virginia law.45 After hearing the testimony of both experts, the
trial court found that the defendant suffered from mental illness
because of her history of drug abuse. 6 Based upon this evidence
of mental illness, the court determined the defendant did not
meet the criteria for release because she posed a threat to others
and was highly likely to violate her release conditions.7 The
court, therefore, ordered the defendant to remain involuntarily
confined. 8
On appeal, Mercer argued that her diagnosed conditions were
not "mental illnesses," and thus the court erred by ordering her
continued commitment.4 9 The court, however, noted that, in Kan-
sas v. Hendricks,25 the United States Supreme Court held that it
had never "required State legislatures to adopt any particular
nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes.' 25' Thus, the
court held that the determination of whether a person was men-
tally ill was a question of fact for the trial court to determine. 2
The court, consequently, ruled that the trial court had properly
24L Id. at 238, 523 S.E.2d at 214.
242. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-182.2 (Repl. Vol. 2000) (providing in pertinent
part, that a person acquitted by reason of insanity shall be placed in the temporary cus-
tody of the Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse
Services "for evaluation as to whether the acquittee may be released with or without con-
ditions or requires commitment").
243. Mercer, 259 Va. at 238, 523 S.E.2d at 214.
244. Id.
245. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-1 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cune. Supp. 2000).
246. Mercer, 259 Va. at 239, 523 S.E.2d at 215.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 239-40, 523 S.E.2d at 215.
250. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
251 Mercer, 259 Va. at 242, 523 S.E.2d at 216 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359).
252. Id. at 242, 523 S.E.2d at 216.
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made its determination and thus affirmed the lower court's deci-
so.253
sion."
C. Evidence
1. Prior Acts Evidence
In Medici v. Commonwealth,254 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the Court of Appeals of Virginia decision upholding the
defendant's convictions for various sex offenses.255 Medici alleged
that the trial court erred when it refused to strike a juror for
cause who had admitted that her husband had been murdered
and the defendant in that case was represented by the same at-
torney as Medici." 6 Pursuant to Cantrell v. Crews,2 57 the supreme
court found that the trial court committed reversible error by not
striking the juror for cause."'
In addition, Medici argued that the trial court erred when it
admitted evidence of his prior California rape convictions.2 59 Ad-
mission of this evidence, he contended, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee.26 ° The court, however, held
that "'due process does not require that an accused be given a bi-
furcated trial when he is charged under a statute authorizing en-
hanced punishment for repeating offenders."26' The court ex-
plained that the trial court specifically instructed the jury that
the defendant's prior convictions were for proof of prior conviction
only, and not "proof that [Medici] committed the offenses to which
he is charged."262
The defendant also argued that the trial court erred by admit-
ting the California rape convictions because the California statute
allowed a conviction for some acts that were not specified in the
253. Id. at 243, 523 S.E.2d at 217.
254. 260 Va. 223, 532 S.E.2d 28 (2000).
255. Id. at 231, 532 S.E.2d at 33.
256. Id. at 226, 532 S.E.2d at 30.
257. 259 Va. 47, 50, 523 S.E.2d 502, 503 (2000) (holding that the trial court erred by
not striking a juror who was a client of the plaintiff's firm).
258. Medici, 260 Va. at 227, 532 S.E.2d at 31.
259. Id. at 227-28, 532 S.E.2d at 31.
260. Id. at 228, 532 S.E.2d at 31.
261. Id. at 228-29, 532 S.E.2d at 31 (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 56, 59,
307 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1983)).
262. Id. at 229, 532 S.E.2d at 31-32 (alteration in original).
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Virginia statute.2" The court disagreed, and held that the Vir-
ginia statute allowed for the admission of other State convictions
for crimes that were "substantially similar" and that the Califor-
nia offenses met that criterion.26
In Turner v. Commonwealth,265 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the denial of the defendant's petition for appeal by the
Court of Appeals of Virginia.266 Here, the defendant was convicted
of abducting a seventeen-year-old female from a mall parking lot
and raping and sodomizing her.267 Turner was matched to the
crime by DNA evidence on file because he had been convicted of
two prior rapes.2 68 Over the defendant's objections, the trial court
permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of these ear-
lier rapes because of their similarity to the present crime.269
On appeal, Turner argued that the prior crimes should not
have been admitted because these offenses were dissimilar to the
present crimes and, moreover, that too much time had passed be-
tween the commission of the previous offenses and the present
criminal acts. The court nevertheless held that when seeking to
introduce prior acts to establish a modus operandi, the evidence
does not have to be so exact as to represent a "signature;" it just
has to bear a "'singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the
offense charged."' 271 Because the Commonwealth had shown a
"strong resemblance" between the earlier offense and the present
crime, the court found the prior acts admissible.2 2
The court also held that, although the length of time between a
prior act and a present offense may have an effect on the admis-
sibility of evidence, the case at bar was not one in which the evi-
dence was stale. 3 The court noted that during the majority of
263. Id. at 229, 532 S.E.2d at 32.
264. Id. at 230, 532 S.E.2d at 32 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.5:3(0) (Repl. Vol.
1996)).
265. 259 Va. 645, 529 S.E.2d 787 (2000).
266. Id. at 653, 529 S.E.2d at 792.
267. Id. at 648, 529 S.E.2d at 789.
268. Id. at 649, 529 S.E.2d at 789.
269. Id. at 650-52, 529 S.E.2d at 790-91.
270. Id. at 650, 529 S.E.2d at 790.
271. Id. at 651, 529 S.E.2d at 791 (quoting Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311,
326-27, 488 S.E.2d 638, 649 (1994)).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 652-53, 529 S.E.2d at 791-92.
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time between the prior offenses and the present acts, Turner had
been incarcerated for those earlier crimes.2 74 This interposition of
prison time prevented the prior acts from being too remote to
have probative value. 5
2. The Admission of Prior-Crimes Evidence Was Not Harmless
Error
In Cooper v. Commonwealth,276 the police arrested the defen-
dant for possession of an imitation controlled substance with the
intent to distribute.277 The officer asked the defendant if the sub-
stance was "demo," street-slang for fake cocaine, and the defen-
dant replied "you know it."278 During the resulting trial for pos-
session of an imitation controlled substance with the intent to
distribute, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that two
months earlier, the defendant had sold imitation cocaine to an
undercover state trooper.7 9 The Commonwealth argued that the
introduction of the prior sale was proper because it helped to
prove "motive, intent, or knowledge" of the defendant and was a
proper exception to the normal rule that evidence of other crimes
is generally inadmissible to prove guilt.28 ° The Court of Appeals of
Virginia, however, sitting en banc, reasoned that there needed to
be a clear nexus between the two events for the evidence of prior
crimes to be admitted into evidence,28 ' and held that the required
nexus between the defendant's arrest and the prior alleged sale to
an undercover police officer did not exist.2"2 As the admission of
this prior act was not harmless error, the court reversed and re-
manded the case.283
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. 31 Va. App. 643, 525 S.E.2d 72 (Ct. App. 2000).
277. Id. at 646, 525 S.E.2d at 73.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 647, 525 S.E.2d at 74.
280. Id. at 648, 525 S.E.2d at 74 (quoting Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138,
495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998)).
281. Id. (citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 480, 486, 438 S.E.2d 296, 300
(1993)).
282. Id. at 648-49, 525 S.E.2d at 74-75.
283. Id. at 650-51, 525 S.E.2d at 75-76.
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3. The Availability of Non-Testifying Witnesses
In Paden v. Commonwealth,2M the Supreme Court of Virginia
overturned the defendant's robbery conviction.288 Paden was one
of three men tried together for the robbery of a movie theater.286
During the trial, the judge permitted a police investigator to tes-
tify about statements made to him by one of Paden's co-
defendants.87 Paden objected to that testimony as hearsay.88 The
Commonwealth argued that the statements were admissible un-
der a hearsay exception that permits the introduction of such a
statement at trial if (among other things) the declarant was un-
able to testify.289 The defendant argued that because a co-
defendant, who was present at a trial, made the statement, the
declarant was available; hence, the statement was inadmissi-
ble.290 The supreme court agreed, holding that unless and until
the co-defendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination,
he was still available to testify.291 The statement thus should not
have been admitted, the court reasoned, until the declarant actu-
ally exercised his privilege.292
4. Unavailable Declarant and the Admission of Prior Testimony
In Longshore v. Commonwealth,293 the trial court allowed the
Commonwealth to introduce the preliminary hearing testimony of
a witness who was unavailable at trial.29 During the preliminary
hearing, the defendant questioned the witness.295 Before the de-
fendant's trial, the Commonwealth issued a summons for the
witness to appear, but he was never served with the witness sub-
poena and, thus, did not appear at trial.296 Over the defendant's
284. 259 Va. 595, 529 S.E.2d 792 (2000).
285. Id. at 596, 529 S.E.2d at 792.
286. Id. at 596, 529 S.E.2d at 793.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. (citing Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 408, 247 S.E.2d 685, 688
(1978)).
290. Id.
29L Id. at 597, 529 S.E.2d at 793.
292. Id.
293. 260 Va. 3, 530 S.E.2d 146 (2000).
294. Id. at 3, 530 S.E.2d at 146.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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objection, the trial court admitted the witness's preliminary
hearing testimony into evidence.297 The defendant was subse-
quently convicted of robbery.98 The Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed, explaining that the defendant had full opportunity to ex-
amine the witness at the preliminary hearing and that, as it was
made during a judicial proceeding, the challenged testimony was
sufficiently reliable to admit at trial.299
5. Evidentiary Sufficiency
a. Narcotics Possession
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, held in
McNair v. Commonwealth, °° that although the defendant had
consented to the police officers' search of his apartment, the evi-
dence was insufficient to support a conviction for cocaine posses-
sion.8 °' In that case, defendant McNair was convicted of cocaine
possession after the trial court denied his suppression motion.0 2
A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's
rulings,0 3 and the court subsequently granted the defendant's
motion for en banc rehearing.30 4
The facts adduced at trial showed that police officers responded
to a report that a robbery was in progress in McNair's apart-
ment.0 5 McNair informed the officers he believed the robbers re-
mained inside his apartment. 306 Acting at McNair's request, two
officers searched the apartment.0 7 During their search, the offi-
cers discovered a glass test tube lying in plain view on the defen-
dant's bedroom floor.30 ' The tube contained a white substance,
subsequently determined to be crack.0 9 When asked about the
297. Id.
298. Longshore v. Commonwealth, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 431, at *1 (Ct. App. July 13,
1999).
299. Longshore, 260 Va. at 4, 530 S.E.2d at 147.
300. 31 Va. App. 76, 521 S.E.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1999).
301. Id. at 80, 521 S.E.2d at 305.
302. Id.
303. McNair v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 559, 513 S.E.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1999).
304. See McNair v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 84, 515 S.E.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1999).
305. McNair, 31 Va. App. at 80, 521 S.E.2d at 305.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 80, 521 S.E.2d at 305-06.
308. Id. at 81, 521 S.E.2d at 306.
309. Id.
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test tube, McNair explained that the intruders must have
dropped it during the robbery. 1 °
The court of appeals concluded that the apartment search was
lawful, as McNair had asked the officers to search his apart-
ment. 11 Although the court upheld the search's legality, it ruled
that merely finding the test tube containing the crack on the de-
fendant's bedroom floor-given the unusual circumstances of the
robbery-was insufficient evidence from which to conclude that
McNair, and not the alleged robbers, possessed the cocaine. 312 In-
deed, McNair's bedroom was in considerable disarray, evidencing
that someone, presumably the would-be robbers, had searched for
something.313 Given that the police discovered no other evidence
of illegal narcotics activity, and McNair denied ownership of the
drugs, the mere presence of the test tube was insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction. 14
b. Arson Prosecutions
In Hickson v. Commonwealth,315 the Supreme Court of Virginia
found the evidence, largely circumstantial in nature, insufficient
to convict the defendant of arson.1 6 Although the supreme court
noted that "[a]rson is a crime of stealth" and "[t]he proof is often
necessarily circumstantial,"1 ' it concluded that the Common-
wealth did not provide an unbroken evidentiary chain that linked
the defendant to the crime. 8
c. Malicious Wounding
In Commonwealth v. Smith,319 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the Court of Appeals of Virginia decision to overturn the
310. Id.
311. Id. at 82-85, 521 S.E.2d at 306-08.
312. Id. at 85-88, 521 S.E.2d at 308-09.
313. Id. at 87, 521 S.E.2d at 309.
3146 Id. at 87-88, 521 S.E.2d at 309.
315. 258 Va. 383, 520 S.E.2d 643 (1999).
316. Id. at 385, 520 S.E.2d at 644.
317. Id. at 387, 520 S.E.2d at 645 (citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 432, 309
S.E.2d 325, 329 (1983)).
318. Id. at 388, 520 S.E.2d at 645 (citing Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169,
313 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984)).
319. 259 Va. 780, 529 S.E.2d 78 (2000).
2000]
780 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:749
defendant's conviction for malicious wounding.32 ° In Smith, the
victim and the defendant became involved in an altercation.32' Al-
though the victim was stabbed, not merely beaten, he admitted
that he did not see the defendant in possession of any weapons
and that he could not testify as to whether the defendant had
done anything other than punch or hit him.22 The court noted
that the victim never saw a weapon and could only indicate that
some of the stab wounds were in the area where Smith struck
him. 23 Because the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
could not rule out other rational hypotheses for the victim's
wounds, the court affirmed the court of appeals decision to re-
verse the conviction, explaining that "the evidence raises no more
than a suspicion of Smith's guilt."'
2. Evidentiary Sufficiency and Witness Credibility
In Phan v. Commonwealth,32' the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, mali-
cious wounding, and two counts of use of a firearm in commission
of a felony.3 26 Although the defendant challenged the sufficiency
of the testimony against him and offered his own alibi witnesses,
the court held that the jury properly weighed the witnesses'
credibility and, while no single witness could positively identify
the defendant as the murderer, "'the combined force of many con-
current and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may
lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion of guilt."
327
3. Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Support of a Self-Defense
Claim
In Peeples v. Commonwealth,32' the Court of Appeals of Vir-
320. Id. at 784, 529 S.E.2d at 79.
321. Id. at 782, 529 S.E.2d at 78.
322. Id. at 782, 529 S.E.2d at 78-79.
323. Id. at 783, 529 S.E.2d at 79.
324. Id. at 784, 529 S.E.2d at 79 (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 1999 Va. App.
LEXIS 148, at *4 (Ct. App. Mar. 2, 1999) (unpublished decision)).
325. 258 Va. 506, 521 S.E.2d 282 (1999).
326. Id. at 510, 521 S.E.2d at 284.
327. Id. at 514, 521 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,
273, 257 S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)).
328. 30 Va. App. 626, 519 S.E.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1999).
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
ginia, sitting en banc, affirmed the defendant's convictions for ag-
gravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm in commission
of a felony." 9 Here, the defendant shot the victim several times,
but claimed the shooting was in self-defense and in the heat of
passion."' ° At trial, defendant Peeples offered that a psychologist
would testify that he was mildly mentally retarded and had diffi-
culty correctly interpreting social situations, and thus tended to
react inappropriately. 3 1 Such expert testimony, Peeples con-
tended, would demonstrate that his actions were in fact a result
of his mental disabilities.332 The trial court nonetheless granted
the prosecution's motion to exclude the expert testimony from the
trial's guilt phase.333
The court of appeals held that because there was insufficient
evidence to establish the self-defense or heat-of-passion defenses,
the expert's opinion in aid of those defenses was properly ex-
cluded.334 The court further held that in the absence of an insan-
ity defense, the criminal defendant's mental state at the time of
the offense was irrelevant to the issue of guilt.335
X
D. Juvenile Crime Issues
1. Parental Notice of Court Proceedings
In Moore v. Commonwealth,3 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the defendant's convictions on two counts of murder and
the use of a firearm in commission of those crimes. 3 7 The defen-
dant, a juvenile, was tried as an adult for murder.3 8 The original
charges were filed in the Loudoun County Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court but, after a transfer hearing, were trans-
ferred to circuit court.3 9 Virginia Code sections 16.1-263 and
329. Id. at 628, 519 S.E.2d at 383.
330. Id. at 629-30, 519 S.E.2d at 383-84.
331. Id. at 629-30, 519 S.E.2d at 383.
332. Id. at 630, 519 S.E.2d at 383-84.
333. Id. at 629-30, 519 S.E.2d at 383.
334' Id. at 634-35, 519 S.E.2d at 385-86.
335. Id. at 634, 519 S.E.2d at 385.
336. 259 Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000).
337. Id. at 434, 527 S.E.2d at 407.
338. Id. at 435, 527 S.E.2d at 407-08.
339. Id.
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16.1-264, in effect at the time the defendant was tried, required
the notification of both parents whenever proceedings were initi-
ated against a juvenile.34 ° Although the defendant's mother was
summoned to appear in juvenile court, his biological father was
not notified.34' The juvenile court made no certification in the rec-
ord that the identity of the defendant's father was not reasonably
ascertainable.342 In fact, the defendant's biological father's name
and city of residence were available in a social history report filed
by a juvenile probation counselor. 43 The defendant's counsel,
however, raised no objection to the defect in the juvenile court
proceedings and did not raise the issue of the failure to give no-
tice to the defendant's father in the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia.34
4
The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the
requirement of parental notice was mandatory, the defect was not
waivable, and, therefore, the juvenile court never acquired sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged.345 The court ex-
plained that if the Commonwealth sought to try the defendant
again, he would have to be tried as an adult, because he had
reached the age of majority. 46
2. Establishment of Custodial Relationships
In DeAmicis v. Commonwealth,47 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, affirmed the defendant's convictions for
taking indecent liberties with a minor and for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. 4 On the initial appeal, a panel of the
court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for taking in-
decent liberties with a minor, but reversed his other conviction. 9
340. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-263, -264 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
341. Moore, 259 Va. at 435, 527 S.E.2d at 407.
342. Id. at 436, 527 S.E.2d at 408.
343. Id. at 434-35, 527 S.E.2d at 407.
344. Id. at 435, 527 S.E.2d at 407.
345. Id. at 436-40, 527 S.E.2d at 408-11.
346. Id. at 440-41, 527 S.E.2d at 411.
347. 31 Va. App. 437, 524 S.E.2d 151 (Ct. App. 2000).
348. Id. at 439-40, 524 S.E.2d at 152. Virginia Code sections 18.2-370.1 and 18.2-371
define the crimes of taking indecent liberties with a minor and contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-370.1, -371 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp.
2000).
349. DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 751, 514 S.E.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1999).
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The Commonwealth petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the
en banc court affirmed both convictions.350
The victim's mother took her child to the defendant, who was
allegedly a licensed counselor, because the child was having seri-
ous difficulties in school."' In a seemingly bizarre twist, the de-
fendant informed the victim's mother that he was going to have
the victim model for him and he would photograph her. 52 The de-
fendant, over the course of several months, photographed the ju-
venile victim in various states of undress.353 The victim's mother
discovered the photos and turned them over to the authorities. 4
The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that
established a custodial or supervisory relationship between him-
self and the victim that was legally necessary to support the fel-
ony conviction. 5 The court held that the mother of the victim en-
trusted control and custody of the child to the defendant, thus
fulfilling the statutory requirement.3 " The defendant further ar-
gued that his conduct never put the child in danger-a prerequi-
site for a child in need of servicesY. The court found, however,
that Virginia Code section 18.2-371 declares that a child who is
abused or neglected is in need of services.35 1 The court held that
the defendant's felonious conduct with respect to the child ful-
filled the abuse or neglect requirement, and thus affirmed both of
the defendant's convictions.359
E. Jury Instructions
1. Abolition of Parole and the Possibility of Geriatric Release
In Fishback v. Commonwealth,6 ° the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed and remanded a Court of Appeals of Virginia deci-
350. DeAmidis, 31 Va. App. at 440, 514 S.E.2d at 152.
35L Id. at 440-41, 514 S.E.2d at 152.
352. Id. at 441, 514 S.E.2d at 152-53.
353. Id. at 442, 514 S.E.2d at 153.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 442-43, 514 S.E.2d at 153.
356. Id. at 443-44, 514 S.E.2d at 154.
357. Id. at 444, 514 S.E.2d at 154.
358. Id. at 444-45, 514 S.E.2d at 154-55.
359. Id. at 445, 514 S.E.2d at 155.
360. 260 Va. 104, 532 S.E.2d 629 (2000).
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sion36' that denied the defendant a jury instruction that would
have explained the abolition of parole under Virginia Code section
53.1-165.1 for non-capital felonies committed after January 1,
1995.362 The supreme court held that the trial court should have
granted the defendant both this jury instruction and also an in-
struction that would have informed jurors of the possibility of the
defendant's geriatric release pursuant to Virginia Code section
53.1-40.01.363 Similarly, the court ruled that the jury was entitled
to be instructed about the possibility of good-time credits that can
allow a defendant to reduce her sentence by as much as fifteen
percent.364
This decision is significant in that it overruled, in part, the su-
preme court's earlier decision in Yarbrough v. Commonwealth,
365
which held that, although a defendant in a capital murder trial
was entitled to a jury instruction that the defendant was parole-
ineligible, a defendant charged with a non-capital felony was
not.366 Similarly, the court modified its decision in Coward v.
Commonwealth3 67 to the extent that it held that the jury should
be instructed about the possibility of geriatric release. 68
Interestingly, issues surrounding jury instructions regarding
parole eligibility were considered only months before in Yar-
brough, which was partially modified by Fishback.3 69 In Yar-
brough, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the defendant's
capital murder and robbery convictions, but vacated and re-
manded for re-sentencing.37 ° The court held that the defendant
was entitled to an instruction that would have advised the jury
that he was ineligible for parole.371' The trial court refused such a
jury instruction during the trial's sentencing phase, explaining
361. Fishback v. Commonwealth, No. 1377-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 345 (Ct. App.
June 15, 1999) (unpublished decision).
362. Fishback, 260 Va. at 117, 532 S.E.2d at 635. Virginia Code section 53.1-165.1
abolishes parole for non-capital felonies committed after January 1, 1995. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-165.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
363. Fishback, 260 Va. at 117, 532 S.E.2d at 635.
364. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-202.3 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
365. 258 Va. 347, 519 S.E.2d 602 (1999).
366. See Fishback, 260 Va. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634 n.4.
367. 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797 (1935).
368. See Fishback, 260 Va. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634.
369. Id. at 115-16, 532 S.E.2d at 634.
370. Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 375, 519 S.E.2d at 617.
371. Id. at 374, 519 S.E.2d at 616.
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that precedent precluded instructions regarding a defendant's pa-
role eligibility. 2
Following his convictions for capital murder and robbery, the
defendant requested that a parole-ineligibility instruction be
given to the juryY3 The Commonwealth opposed the request, ar-
guing that such an instruction was proper only if the prosecution
argued for the death penalty based upon the defendant's future
dangerousness; here, by contrast, the Commonwealth argued for
the death penalty given the crime's vileness. 4 The court refused
to give the instruction." 5 During its deliberations, the jury re-
quested an explanation about the length of a life sentence.7 6 The
trial judge refused to explain to the jury the "life means life" con-
cept as the defendant requested.377 The jury subsequently recom-
mended the death penalty.7 8
On an automatic appeal, the court noted that this was a matter
of first impression.7 9 Following Virginia's decision to abolish pa-
role, this was the first case that the court reviewed where the
Commonwealth had relied on the crime's "vile nature," rather
than the defendant's "future dangerousness," as the reason for
seeking the death penalty.38 Both the defendant and the Com-
monwealth relied on Simmons v. South Carolina.. in their
briefs. 82 The defendant argued that Simmons created a broad
due process right "that a jury be fully informed as to what the re-
alities of sentences are,"3' while the Commonwealth argued the
case limited the right to a "life is life" instruction only if the ques-
tion of future dangerousness was involved.3 ' The court, however,
reasoned that no constitutional right exists--either in the Federal
372. Id. at 358, 519 S.E.2d at 607.
373. Id. at 357-58, 519 S.E.2d at 606.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 358, 519 S.E.2d at 606.
376. Id. at 358, 519 S.E.2d at 607.
377. Id. at 358-59, 519 S.E.2d at 607.
378. Id. at 359, 519 S.E.2d at 607.
379. Id. at 366, 519 S.E.2d at 612.
380. Id. at 366, 519 S.E.2d at 611.
381. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that when a defendant was charged with a capital
offense and the underlying reason the state sought the death penalty was the future
dangerousness of the offender, the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction that he was
ineligible for parole).
382. Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 366, 519 S.E.2d at 611.
383. Id. at 367, 519 S.E.2d at 612.
384. Id.
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Constitution or in the Virginia Constitution-for a defendant to
be sentenced by a jury.385 When a jury is given the responsibility
of recommending a sentence, "the defendant's right to trial by an
informed jury requires that the jury be adequately apprised of the
nature of the range of sentences it may impose so that it may as-
sess an appropriate punishment.""6 Rather, the court ultimately
found that a defendant in a capital case who is parole-ineligible
cannot be treated any more harshly by a jury that fully under-
stands both of the possible sentences available to them.8 7 Be-
cause the proffered instruction would not hinder a defendant's
rights, and indeed could only benefit a defendant, the trial judge
should-if so requested by the defendant-instruct the jury that
life imprisonment means life imprisonment without possibility of
parole. 8 The court, therefore, affirmed the defendant's convic-
tions for both capital murder and robbery, but vacated the death
sentence and remanded the case back to the trial court with in-
structions to resentence the defendant in accordance with the
court's ruling.38 9
2. Offense Elements
In Dobson v. Commonwealth,390 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed a conviction in which the defendant challenged a jury
instruction telling the jurors they could infer that the defendant
was the thief from proof that he was in recent exclusive posses-
sion of the stolen property.39' In this case, a Virginia State
Trooper stopped Dobson, who was driving a stolen rental car. 92
At trial, the jury was instructed that it could infer, from the proof
that Dobson was currently in possession of the stolen vehicle,
that he was the thief.39
Dobson argued that the instruction was a violation of his due
385. Id. at 369, 519 S.E.2d at 613.
386. Id.
387. See id. at 373, 519 S.E.2d at 615-16.
388. Id. at 374, 519 S.E.2d at 615-16.
389. Id.
390. 260 Va. 71, 531 S.E.2d 569 (2000).
391. Id. at 73, 531 S.E.2d at 570.
392. Id. at 73-74, 531 S.E.2d at 570-71.
393. Id. at 73-74, 531 S.E.2d at 570-71.
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process rights because it shifted the burden to him to prove that
he was not the thief and thereby relieved the Commonwealth of
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of
the charged offense.394 The court held, however, that "the Due
Process Clause does not prohibit the use of a permissive inference
as a procedural device that shifts to a defendant the burden of
producing some evidence contesting a fact that may otherwise be
inferred, provided that the prosecution retains the ultimate bur-
den of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 95 The court noted that
the test to determine if a jury instruction violates a defendant's
due process rights is if the instruction creates a mandatory pre-
sumption, or merely a permissive inference. 8' In the present
case, the court held that the instruction did not require the jury to
draw any conclusions from the facts proved by the Common-
wealth in the absence of such contrary evidence from the defen-
dant.9 ' In addition, the court observed that the trial court in-
structed the jury that the Commonwealth had to prove every
element beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant was
presumed innocent.398
3. Lesser-Included Offenses
In Commonwealth v. Dalton,399 the defendant was charged with
first-degree murder. °0 He alleged, however, that while he had as-
sisted in the murder's concealment, he had not actually been a
party to the killing.401 He thus requested the trial court to in-
struct the jury that it could find him guilty of being an accessory
after the fact even though he had not been charged with that of-
fense.40 2 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected that contention,
however, explaining that, as the defendant was not charged with
being an accessory after the fact, and that such a crime is not a
lesser-included offense to murder, the trial court was correct in
394. Id. at 74, 531 S.E.2d at 571.
395. Id. at 74-75, 531 S.E.2d at 571.
396. Id. at 75, 531 S.E.2d at 571.
397. Id. at 76, 531 S.E.2d at 572.
398. Id.
399. 259 Va. 249,524 S.E.2d 860 (2000).
400. Id. at 251, 524 S.E.2d at 861.
401. Id. at 252-53, 524 S.E.2d at 862.
402. Id. at 251, 524 S.E.2d at 861.
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refusing the requested jury instruction. °3
4. Concert of Action
In McLean v. Commonwealth, °4 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, affirmed a trial court judge's instruction
that answered a jury's question regarding intent by using a the-
ory of a concert of action among the parties."5 In this case, the de-
fendant was charged with a robbery and murder that arose from
the beating and stabbing of the victim.40 6 McLean was one of
three men who attacked and robbed the victim.40 7 During jury de-
liberations, although the court declined to answer a jury question
regarding "intent," it did respond to the following question the
jury posed: "'Once the intent is spoken by one member of a group
and the act is performed, does the intent to commit the act apply
to all?'"4"' McLean objected to having the judge answer this ques-
tion and instead requested that the judge instruct the jury that
the defendant's "mere presence" at the scene was insufficient to
establish his guilt.40 9 The court denied McLean's request and in-
stead instructed the jury that, if there was a "concert of action" to
commit a crime, all those who participated in the crime were
equally responsible. 4 0 After receiving this instruction, the jury
convicted the defendant of capital murder and robbery.41'
On appeal, the defendant argued (among other assignments of
error) that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury as to "con-
cert of action."412 The court of appeals, however, held that it was
"proper for a trial court to fully and completely respond to the
jury's inquiry concerning its duties."' 3 The court further held
that McLean was not entitled to a "mere presence" instruction.41"
403. Id. at 255, 524 S.E.2d at 863.
404. 30 Va. App. 322, 516 S.E.2d 717 (Ct. App. 1999).
405. Id. at 325-26, 516 S.E.2d at 718.
406. Id. at 325-26, 516 S.E.2d at 718-19.
407. Id. at 326-27, 516 S.E.2d at 719.
408. Id. at 329, 516 S.E.2d at 720.
409. Id.
410. See id. at 328, 516 S.E.2d at 719.
411. Id. at 328, 516 S.E.2d at 720.
412. Id. at 329-30, 516 S.E.2d at 720-21.
413. Id. at 330, 516 S.E.2d at 721 (quoting Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 619,
625, 347 S.E.2d 167, 171 (Ct. App. 1986)).
414. Id. at 332, 516 S.E.2d at 722.
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The court noted that the Commonwealth had argued that
McLean was an active participant in the murder and that his de-
fense to the charge was that he was not present at the murder
scene; thus, neither of those theories fit with a mere presence in-
struction.415 The court, therefore, affirmed the defendant's convic-
tions.416
III. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
The most recent Virginia General Assembly session was nota-
ble only in that it did not work any particularly significant
changes to existing law.417 Indeed, many of the legislative enact-
ments from this session were quite minor.41 The General Assem-
bly's restraint in the criminal justice area could be attributable,
415. Id.
416. Id. at 336, 516 S.E.2d at 724.
417. Many of the changes can be found by visiting the Commonwealth's legislative Web
site. This information is available at http-Jlegl.state.va.us.
418. For example, Virginia Code section 18.2-67.5:2 was amended to expand the list of
sexual offenses for which a second or subsequent offense is punishable by the maximum
amount allowable for the latest offense, none of which is subject to suspension. S.B. 176,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 333, 2000 Va. Acts
475) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.5:2 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). The change
also allows a second offense, taken from section 18.2-67.5:3, for those sexual offenses that
carry up to life imprisonment upon a second offense, aggravate the punishment of a less
serious first offense. Id. Virginia Code section 18.2-370 was also amended to make a sec-
ond or subsequent offense of taking indecent liberties with children a Class 5 felony; be-
fore, all offenses were punished as Class 6 felony offenses. Id. (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-67.2, -370 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). Virginia Code section 18.2-67.4 was
amended to provide that the definition of sexual abuse, as defined in section 18.2-67.10,
applies to criminal sexual battery. H.B. 169, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted
as Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch. 832, 2000 Va. Acts 1782) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.4 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). Virginia Code section 18.2-473.1, making it unlawful to
communicate with a prisoner without authorization, was amended so that the definition of
"prisoner" would be consistent with other sections of the Code. H.B. 78, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 286, 2000 Va. Acts 415) (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-473.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). The General Assembly added
a new code section, 18.2-57.01, which makes it a Class 2 misdemeanor to project a laser
light onto someone they know, or should have reason to know, is a law enforcement officer.
H.B. 437, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 350,
2000 Va. Acts 498) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.01 (Cum. Supp.
2000)). Virginia Code section 19.2-245.1 was amended to include the venue where a forged
document is found in the possession of the defendant as a proper one for trial. H.B. 1156,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 327, 2000 Va. Acts
472) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-245.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). Virginia
Code section 18.2-248.1 was amended to enhance the penalty for supplying marijuana to
an inmate from a Class 5 felony to a Class 4 felony. S.B. 199, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch. 819, 2000 Va. Acts 1730) (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
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in part, to the fairly extensive statutory changes wrought in 1994
and 1996-particularly in the area of juvenile justice-and the
general decline in crime rates. With the decline in crime, the
General Assembly has been able to focus its attention else-
where.41 9
A. Felonious Sexual Contact
Following the lead of other jurisdictions that have enacted
similar prohibitions, the General Assembly added a new section
to the Virginia Code, section 18.2-67.4:1, which makes it a Class 6
felony for anyone who knows they are infected with HIV, Syphi-
lis, or Hepatitis B to engage in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus,
fellatio, anallingus, or anal intercourse with the intent to trans-
mit the infection to another person.4" As with other statutes of
this sort, enacted in the wake of the AIDS crisis and highly publi-
cized stories involving such intentional infections, proof of intent
will likely be a difficult prosecutorial hurdle to overcome.
B. Community Corrections
The General Assembly amended multiple code sections421' and
added two entirely new sections under the heading of the "Com-
prehensive Community Corrections Act for Local Responsible Of-
fenders."422 The Act defines local services as community-based
probation and requires localities to adopt local community crimi-
nal justice boards and make mandatory the service of those offi-
cials already appointed to these boards.4' The Act also expands
the options for removal of an offender for intractable behavior
419. See, e.g., Cullen D. Seltzer, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Criminal Law and
Procedure, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1281 (1996); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1467 (1996); Robert E.
Shepard, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 28 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1075 (1994).
420. H.B. 141, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch.
831, 2000 Va. Acts 1781) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
421. H.B. 202, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch.
1040, 2000 Va. Acts 2487) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-57.3, -64.2,
-67.4, 19.2-299.2, -303.3, 53.1-82.1, -82.3,-150, -180, -181,-182,-182.1,-183,-184,-185,
-185.1, -185.2, and -185.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
422. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-152.4:1, 53.1-182.1:1 (Cure. Supp. 2000)).
423. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-183 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
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and, significantly, limits participation in the program to persons
who receive a sentence of fewer than twelve months.424
C. "Date Rape" Drugs
In light of the concern over so-called "date rape" drugs, the
General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections 54.1-3446 and
54.1-3450 and added Virginia Code section 18.2-251.3 to make it
a Class 3 felony to possess with the intent to distribute gamma
hydroxybutyric acid ("GHB") 5 GHB, one of the drug's common
street names, has been identified as a "date rape" drug and had
not previously been listed in the Virginia Drug Control Act.426
D. Expanded Definition of "Law Enforcement Officers" for
Purposes of Enhancing Punishments
Virginia Code section 18.2-57 was amended to add jail officers,
deputy sheriffs, and game wardens to law enforcement officers
listed in this section.427 Those committing assault and battery
against these officers will now receive the enhanced punishment
already in effect for other law enforcement personnel under this
section.4"
E. Exempting Necessary School Discipline Statutory Assault and
Battery
In a popular, albeit controversial, move, the General Assembly
modified Virginia Code section 18.2-57 to exempt a teacher acting
in her official capacity from the assault and battery statute for
certain actions deemed essential for disciplinary purposes or for
the need to maintain classroom order.429
424. See id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
425. H.B. 280, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch.
348, 2000 Va. Acts 492) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3466, -3450 (Cue.
Supp. 2000)) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
426. See id.
427. H.B. 297, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch.
288, 2000 Va. Acts 415) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Cum. Supp.
2000)).
428. Id.
429. See H.B. 1229, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 8,
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F. Unlawful Use of Official Identification Documents
To combat the apparently increasing rise in document fraud
and identity theft, the General Assembly added a new section to
the Virginia Code, section 18.2-186.3, that makes it unlawful to
obtain the identification documents of another and to use them
with the intent to defraud. 30 The identity fraud statute punishes
acts resulting in losses of less than $200 as Class 1 misdemeanors
for the first offense and subsequent convictions as Class 6 felo-
nies.43' Any offense that causes a loss of more than $200 will
automatically be a Class 6 felony. 2 If the identifying documents
are used to avoid arrest or impede a criminal investigation, the
offense will also be a Class 6 felony. 3
G. Increased Punishments for Driving Under the Influence
With an eye to the tragedies caused by those driving under the
influence of alcohol and other drugs, the General Assembly
amended Virginia Code section 18.2-270 to enhance the manda-
tory minimum period of confinement for a second driving-under-
the-influence ("DUI") offense within five years from forty-eight
hours to five days.434 The Virginia Code now requires a manda-
tory minimum period of confinement of ten days for a third DUI
offense within ten years and thirty-day confinement for a third
2000, ch. 682, 2000 Va. Acts 1302) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(F)
(Cum. Supp. 2000)). The actions allowed include:
(i) incidental, minor or reasonably physical contact or other actions designed
to maintain order and control; (ii) reasonable and necessary force to quell a
disturbance or remove a student from the scene of a disturbance that threat-
ens physical injury to persons or damage to property; (iii) reasonably and
necessary force to prevent a student from inflicting physical harm to himself,
(iv) reasonable and necessary force for self-defense or the defense of others; or
(v) reasonable and necessary force to obtain possession of weapons or other
dangerous objects or controlled substances or associated paraphernalia that
are upon the person of the student or within his control.
Id.
430. H.B. 373, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch.
349, 2000 Va. Acts 497) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. See H.B. 386, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000,
ch. 958, 2000 Va. Acts 2116) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-270, -270.1,
-271.1, 19.2-299.2, 46.2-341.28, -391 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
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offense in five years. 5 The changes also permit a court to impose
an ignition interlock system requirement for up to six months on
anyone convicted of her first DUI offense.436 Anyone convicted of a
second offense within five years is ineligible for a restricted li-
cense for one year following conviction and then must use an igni-
tion interlock system for an additional six months. 7 The ignition
interlock system locks a car's ignition if the driver's blood alcohol
content ("BAC") is more than .025%."z The General Assembly
also amended the section to require a mandatory minimum jail
term for those with a BAC above .20%." For the first offense, a
BAC of at least .20%, but not more than .25%, requires a manda-
tory confinement of five days; if the BAC is above .25%, a manda-
tory confinement of ten days is required." ° For any second or sub-
sequent offense within ten years, a BAC of at least .20%, but not
more than .25%, mandates a ten-day jail term, and above .25% a
stay of at least twenty days."'
H. Detention of Juvenile Offenders in Secure Facilities
The General Assembly changed Virginia Code section 16.1-
248.1 to require that a detention order expressly state the offense
with which a juvenile is being charged and, to the extent practi-
cable, other pending and previous charges against the juvenile
before that juvenile can be placed in a secured detention facil-
ity."2 For clarification purposes, the General Assembly changed
the phrase "unreasonable danger to the person and property of
others" to "a clear and substantial threat to the person or prop-
erty of others," for inclusion as one of the factors to be considered
when determining if a juvenile should be placed in a secured fa-
cility. 3
435. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
436. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
437. Id.
438. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
439. S.B. 525, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch.
784, 2000 Va. Acts 1665) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270 (Cum. Supp.
2000)).
440. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
44L Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
442. H.B. 567, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch.
836, 2000 Va. Acts 1786) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248.1) (Cum.
Supp. 2000)).
443. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
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I. Apprising Juries of Parole Eligibility
In an important nod to the defense bar, and in consideration of
sentencing cases like those discussed in Part E of this article,4'
the General Assembly altered Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 to
permit, upon request from the defendant in a capital case, a jury
instruction that explains to the jurors that, for all Class 1 felony
offenses committed after January 1, 1995, a defendant shall not
be eligible for parole if sentenced to imprisonment for life.4" The
section also requests that the Supreme Court of Virginia, in con-
junction with the Virginia State Bar, recommend such instruc-
tions in non-capital cases.6
J. Application of the Death Penalty to Juveniles
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2-10
to limit the application of the death penalty for a Class 1 felony
conviction to those who are sixteen years of age or older at the
time of the offense." 7
K. Obscenity and Electronic Media
With the advent of computer and other optical and magnetic
storage devices, legislatures have had to come to grips with statu-
torily defining what may constitute an "item" for purposes of
prosecution under obscene materials prohibitions. While it had
generally been the case that obscene materials consisted of only a
single magazine, photograph, or videotape, modem electronic
storage devices create new challenges for legislatures that wish to
make prosecutable obscene items that are stored in these new de-
vices. To this end, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 18.2-373 to include for prosecution any item stored in an
electronic medium that fits the Commonwealth's definition of "ob-
444. See supra notes 360-89 and accompanying text.
445. H.B. 705, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch.
838, 2000 Va. Acts 1789) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Cur. Supp.
2000)).
446. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(E)(Z) (Cur. Supp. 2000)).
447. H.B. 978, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch.
361, 2000 Va. Acts 508) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Cur. Supp.
2000)).
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scene."448 In addition, as a protection for industry, Virginia Code
section 18.2-391 was amended so that an Internet service pro-
vider or a provider of electronic mail will not be liable when a
person using its services commits a prohibited act involving sexu-
ally explicit materials being transmitted to juveniles."9
L. Unlawful Street Gang Activities
The General Assembly added Article 2.1 to Chapter 4 of Title
18.2 of the Virginia Code."5 This new Article creates a series of
separate felonies based on prohibited street gang activity.45' Par-
ticipation in a street gang that commits a criminal act now be-
comes a Class 5 felony, and if the street gang has any juvenile
members, the offense becomes a Class 4 felony.452 The Article fur-
ther creates a separate offense penalizing anyone who recruits
juveniles into prohibited street gang activities. 53
M. Prohibited Contact for Sex Offenders
Public concern about pedophiles being released back into com-
munities prompted the General Assembly to place additional re-
strictions on persons convicted of sex offenses against children. To
this end, the General Assembly added Virginia Code section 18.2-
370.2.' 5' The section prohibits, as part of the sentence, a person
convicted of any one of a number of criminal statutes involving
sexual and other offenses perpetrated against juveniles from loi-
tering within 100 feet of a primary, secondary, or high school for
the remainder of their lives."5 A violation of this section is a
448. See H.B. 1492, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9,
2000, ch. 1009, 2000 Va. Acts 2378) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-373,
-391 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
449. See id. (codified as amended at § 18.2-391(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
450. S.B. 143, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch.
332, 2000 Va. Acts 474) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-46.1, -46.2, -46.3 (Cum. Supp.
2000)).
45. See id.
452. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
453. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
454 See S.B. 197, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000,
ch. 770, 2000 Va. Acts 1651) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10, -11 (Cum. Supp.
2000)).
455. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.2 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). The
20001
796 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:749
Class 6 felony.456
N. The Rights of Crime Victims
In an effort to strengthen certain protections for the victims of
crime, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
19.2-11.01 to require a crime victim to receive notification of any
appeal or habeas corpus proceeding involving her case in addition
to the other victim and witness services provided by this sec-
tion.457
0. DNA Profiling
Issues raised by DNA testing continue to present complicated
questions to legislatures throughout the country. In the face of
significant concerns about privacy, it is clear that state and fed-
eral law enforcement agencies will continue to cooperate in cre-
ating and maintaining DNA banks that contain profiles of known
offenders. In keeping with these federal/state collaborative ef-
forts, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2-
310.5 to require the Division of Forensic Science to confirm
whether or not a DNA profile exists on file for a specific individ-
ual if requested to do so by a federal, state, or local law enforce-
ment officer who requests the information in furtherance of an of-
ficial investigation.458
criminal acts that qualify are: abduction and kidnapping a minor; abduction of a minor
with intent to defile or for immoral purpose; crimes against nature with a minor relative;
adultery or fornication with a minor relative; rape of a child under age thirteen; carnal
knowledge of a child between thirteen and fifteen; carnal knowledge of certain minors;
forcible sodomy with a child under age thirteen, inanimate or animate object sexual pene-
tration of a child under age thirteen; aggravated sexual battery of a child under age thir-
teen; taking indecent liberties with children; taking indecent liberties with child by person
in custodial or supervisory relationship; causing or encouraging acts rendering children
delinquent or abused; possession with intent to distribute of sexually-explicit items in-
volving children; possession of child pornography, and employing a minor to assist in an
obscenity offense. Id.
456. Id.
457. See S.B. 211, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000,
ch. 272, 2000 Va. Acts 400) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.01 (Cum.
Supp. 2000)).
458. See S.B. 619, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2000,
ch. 284, 2000 Va. Acts 412) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.5 (Cum.
Supp. 2000)).
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IV. A FINAL WORD
The Virginia General Assembly, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia, by and large, took a
fairly nuanced view with respect to modifications or advance-
ments in criminal law and procedure. As violent crime rates con-
tinue to fall, courts-in particular-have become perhaps more
sensitive to individuals' civil rights and liberties.
On a slightly different front, this past year reflected the on-
going struggle of governmental agencies to adapt to and to ad-
dress the promise and the potential threat of new technologies
(such as the advent of DNA testing) to the criminal law. Many of
these issues, only now beginning to be considered in the Assembly
and the courts, will continue to pose interesting challenges in the
coming years.

